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We study the effect of social capital on financial capital. Specifically, we study how 
similarity  (matching)  of  borrowers’  and  lenders’  cohorts  along  their  corporate  social 
responsibility  dimension  affects  the  cost  of  debt  financing.  The  main  finding  is  that 
borrowers’ ethical posture alone is not enough for obtaining cheapest rates. Favorable loan 
conditions are obtained when both lenders and borrowers belong to similar cohorts attributing 
high value for social responsibility aspects. Employing an international database composed of 
4,554 syndicated loans involving 175 corporations in 15 different countries for the period 
2003-2006  we  document  a  large  and  significant  reduction  in  lending  rates  when  both 
borrowers and lenders belong to similar cohort along the social responsibility dimension. 
These results withstand a battery of robustness tests. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Information problems induce market failure since complete contracts are difficult to 
specify and enforce. This market failure induces different forms of opportunistic behavior on 
part of the contracting parties and is inherent in debt financing (Aghion and Bolton, 1992).  
Syndicated loans are particularly affected by information problems (Sufi, 2007).  Such 
type of lending involves several banks, with one (or few) of which acts as the lead bank or 
arranger and the rest, the participant banks. This distinction has important consequences for 
the assignment of tasks among participating banks. While participant banks maintain an 
“arm’s-length” relationship with the borrower and only decide on their stake in the 
syndicated loan, the lead bank assumes a pivotal role in the negotiation with the borrower. 
Prior to signing, the lead bank collects information, negotiates terms and conditions, and 
prepares an information memorandum for the rest of lenders with detailed and confidential 
information. After the deal is signed, this bank has to monitor the borrower and its 
compliance with the loan covenants and, in case of default, has to renegotiate the terms of the 
contract. In such setup, information asymmetries are twofold: first, between the borrower and 
the lead bank regarding the quality of the former and, second, between the lead bank and 
participant banks regarding the monitoring intensity the leader implements as well as the 
information transferred to participant banks on borrower’s quality (Dennis and Mullineaux, 
2000).  
The efforts to alleviate these exacerbated information problems leads contracting 
parties to write complicated and detailed contracts, including a large number of covenants on 
different issues such as minimum levels of some key financing ratios, collateral requirements 
or certain maturity requirements and more. The characteristics of these contracts will 2 
 
determine the level of risk sharing among banks as well as the loan spread (Dennis and 
Mullineaux, 2000).  
In this study we focus on additional mechanism that can help reducing these 
contracting failures. In particular, our interest is in investigating whether social capital 
interpreted as a signal of trustworthiness, influences financial contracting and, specifically, 
the cost of debt financing. Social capital can be defined as the social skills and networks that 
enable an individual to overcome imperfect information problems and form contracts with 
others on the basis of trust and trustworthiness (Fukuyama, 1995; Glaeser et al., 2002; 
Ostrom, 1990). In business relationships, such propensity of contracting parts to cooperate for 
producing socially efficient outcomes may have different origins: it may emerge from the 
frequent and repeated interaction among agents, who may develop a solid reputation of 
commitment (Diamond, 1989), it may be a spontaneous behavior motivated by the religious 
beliefs (La Porta et al., 1997), or it may result from cultural, ethnic, racial or social 
similarities between contracting parties (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Giannetti and Yafeh, 
2008; Glaeser et al., 2000; Guiso et al., 2008; Mobius and Szeidl, 2007). In these situations 
agency costs are lower because an opportunistic behavior would eliminate the trust and 
degree of trustworthiness accumulated between contracting parties. At the macroeconomic 
level, Guiso et al. (2006) and Knack and Keefer (1996) have presented evidence indicating 
the positive influence of trust on aggregate economic outcomes. Also, Guiso et al. (2008) 
have shown that the relative trust among European citizens determines bilateral trade, 
investment, and financial flows among countries. At the microeconomic level, some studies 
have examined how trust affects contractual provisions in loans and have found that venture 
capitalists are less likely to fund entrepreneurs in countries in which their citizens have lower 3 
 
trust levels among themselves (Bottazzi et al., 2007), or where lending is plagued with 
discrimination for reasons unrelated to project risk (Alesina et al., 2008; Ravina, 2008). 
This paper approaches the question of whether trust influences the contractual terms 
of loan from a new perspective. In particular, we ask whether loan terms, and in particular, 
loan spreads are affected by similarities in the social responsibility dimension among 
borrowers and lenders. Social responsibility refers to actions that “appear to further some 
social good, beyond the interests of the firms and that which is required by law” (McWilliams 
and Siegel, 2001), and describes a business philosophy under which firms behave honestly 
with its stakeholders, don’t lie, cheat, or steal from them, and honor their commitments 
(Jones, 1995). By avoiding opportunism, firms signal their trustworthiness. Such 
characteristics are especially desirable in business relationships that take place under 
conditions of severe information problems, in which opportunistic behaviors are more likely. 
In such contexts, social responsible firms contract with other economic agents on the basis of 
mutual trust and cooperation, thereby reducing monitoring costs, bonding costs, search costs, 
warranty costs, and residual losses. Social responsible firms must choose their partners 
carefully in order to ensure that the desired benefits of the cooperation emerge. This means 
that socially efficient outcomes are obtained if a social responsible firm correctly discriminate 
the business philosophy of its potential contracting partners and selects those that are probed 
to be equally trustworthy. Thus, a correct matching between contracting parties’ social 
responsibility is indispensable for building a valuable social capital.  
Our main objective in this paper is to study whether indeed matching of social 
responsible borrowers and lenders is reflected in lower cost of capital born by the former. Our 4 
 
contention is that social responsible borrowers may obtain better financing conditions, when 
their lenders are also social responsible institutions. 
We provide evidence for the aforementioned contention using a sample of syndicated 
loans around the world in which information problem are relevant. The data, obtained from 
the DealScan database, has been matched with data on corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
of lenders and borrowers. The final sample contains 4,554 different facilities that correspond 
to 175 corporate borrowers for the period 2003-2006 for which we have information on their 
CSR as well as that of their lenders. Results indicate that there is a reduction in 2.1 basis 
points in the loan spreads when borrowers’ CSR increases by one standard deviation and of 
2.8 basis points if lenders’ CSR increases by one standard deviation. Remarkably, there is an 
additional reduction of 2 basis points when there is a matching between social responsible 
borrowers and lenders. Thus, our results suggest that matching social responsibility positions 
of both lenders and borrowers provides superior debt financing conditions.  
Our research contributes to the literature in two important ways. First, this study is 
one of the few to test the relationship between social capital and the cost of debt financing. In 
doing so, we provide evidence that CSR has an economic payoff, a finding contrasting those 
of Sharfman and Fernando (2008) and Goss and Roberts (2007), who showed how firms with 
high levels of CSR do not obtain better contractual terms, although those with the worst 
scores are penalized. Second, our paper is the first to focus on the complementary effect on 
loan spreads of matching social responsible borrowers and lenders. Such approach allows 
extending the related literature that analyzes the influence of cultural, ethnic, racial or social 
similarities between contracting parties on financial contracting (Alesina and La Ferrara, 5 
 
2002; Giannetti and Yafeh, 2008; Glaeser et al., 2000; Guiso et al., 2008; Mobius and Szeidl, 
2007).  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and presents 
our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our sample, data, and research design. Section 4 presents 
the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes. 
2. CSR AND THE COST OF DEBT FINANCING  
Limited research has been done on the relationship between CSR and bank lending. 
Various arguments have been proposed to hypothesize that improvements in CSR should lead 
to lower costs of capital. First, according to stakeholder theory, “the survival and continuing 
profitability of the corporation depends upon its ability to fulfill its economic and social 
purpose, which is to create and distribute wealth or value sufficient to ensure that each 
primary stakeholder group continues as part of the corporations’ stakeholder system” 
(Clarkson, 1995: 107). Thus, an effective stakeholder management ensures the continued 
participation of stakeholders in the firm and, importantly, can generate intangibles such as 
trust and long-term relationships with suppliers and customers (Hillman and Keim, 2001). In 
a context of incomplete contracting, where different parties may behave opportunistically, 
trusting and cooperative relationships will give the firm a competitive advantage (Jones, 
1995) for two reasons: (i) a trusting and cooperative relationships reduces agency costs as it 
prevents opportunistic behavior; (ii) the development of long-term relationships with primary 
stakeholders like customers, suppliers, communities, and employees, allows firms to expand 
the set of value-creating exchanges beyond those made through regulated markets (Pfeffer, 
1998; Prahalad, 1994). In case of financial suppliers, the level of mutual trust and cooperation 6 
 
between the borrowing firm and such stakeholder can affect the firm’s financing cost 
significantly, especially if firms have few suppliers for establishing long-term relationships 
(Jones, 1995).  
The second set of arguments supporting a negative association between CSR and cost 
of capital relies on the external effects citizenship activities have on organizational 
reputation. Supporting social responsibility goals helps firms to improve, both, brand and 
corporate image (Bramer and Pavelin, 2006; Rowley and Berman, 2000), which are 
important elements of reputation. Beyond achieving a good name for a firm, social 
responsiveness may influence its stakeholders’ judgments, which are the foundation of 
reputation (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). As corporate reputations are representations of 
public opinion about a firm, and as such opinions depend on a firm’s success in meeting the 
expectations of those stakeholders, demonstrating a high degree of CSR is a signal that the 
firm will behave in accordance with stakeholders’ expectations (Bramer and Pavelin, 2006), 
and the firm’s reputation will consequently be augmented (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
This signaling effect of CSR is especially important in a context of information asymmetries, 
such as prevailing in bank lending (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006). In financing relationship, 
financial institutions often regard qualitative attributes of a firm as proxies of its commitment 
for repaying its loans (Denis, 2004). Building positive reputation through CSR activities may 
facilitate firms’ access to capital (Spicer, 1978) and to negotiate better terms with capital 
suppliers (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990).  
A final set of arguments connecting a borrower’s CSR and its financing costs is 
related to risk management and the quality of firm’s debt. The stakeholder literature 
documents that better social performance improves resource efficiency, which in turn causes 7 
 
an increase in firm’s revenues and/or a decrease in its costs. In addition to this direct effect on 
cash flows, Sharfman and Fernando (2008) have recently showed that CSR influences the 
perceived riskiness of a firm’s cash flows. Improving CSR can reduce the likelihood that a 
firm will suffer negative social and environmental disasters that usually give rise to huge 
compensations and cleanup costs, which make a firm more vulnerable to bankruptcy. 
Citizenship activities also alleviate other forms of risk for lenders such as changes in 
legislation or in consumer preferences. Social responsible borrowing firms will have to attend 
to such changes in order to avoid negative media publicity, protests and consumers’ boycotts, 
which erode firm’s legitimacy and reputation and, ultimately, its profitability (Baron, 2001; 
Feddersen and Gilligan, 2001; John and Klein, 2003). Furthermore, pursuing a sustainable 
development strategy implies substantial long-term investment, which cannot be easily 
reversed and whose results will rarely be reflected in enhanced short-term profits. Hence, the 
implementation of such strategy requires a credible long-term commitment by the 
management of not engaging in risky behaviors (Hart, 1995). These characteristics may 
convey a good signal to banks and other financial institutions about creditworthiness of the 
borrowing firm. Therefore, if CSR reduces a borrower’s default risk profile, banks should 
reward this borrower with lower spreads (Sharfman and Fernando, 2008).  
The empirical support for the assertion that CSR may lead to lower loan spreads is 
scarce, although the predictions of stakeholder theory are clear. One of the few studies that 
examined the relationship between CSR and the costs of capital is Sharfman and Fernando 
(2008). These authors do not find support for that hypothesis. Contrarily, their results suggest 
a significant positive relation between the cost of debt and responsible business practices. In 
examining possible nonlinearities in that relationship, the authors do not find evidence of 8 
 
banks penalizing with higher spreads those companies with the lowest or highest CSR scores. 
Precisely, such issue is analyzed by Goss and Roberts (2007) who find that those companies 
with poor social performance face higher cost of capital, which give them incentives to 
improve their CSR. For this reason, few firms show low levels of CSR in the long run. For 
responsible firms, these authors suggest that banks interpret high levels of investment in 
citizenship activities as evidence of agency conflicts and, therefore, they increase yield 
spreads. The result is that companies will move away from very high levels of CSR. In sum, 
these findings document a strategic use of CSR investments by firms, as companies migrate 
away from extreme levels of CSR. 
There are alternative explanations for the lack of support of the hypothesis predicting 
a negative association between CSR and the cost of debt. It may be the case that debt markets 
see investments in CSR as inefficient and punish firms who engage in such investments. In 
fact, critics of CSR point out that it is costly and administratively burdensome for a firm to 
engage in citizenship activities, which will, in turn, result in lower performance levels 
(Friedman, 1970). One source of cost comes from the management of relationships with a 
wide set of stakeholders with conflicting objectives, which can result in an excessively rigid 
and resource-consuming organization (Aupperle et al., 1985). In addition, managers may 
behave opportunistically and follow entrenchment practices (Jones, 1995). According to this 
view, a manager set on entrenchment has incentives to collude with employees, communities, 
customers, and suppliers to protect themselves from disciplining mechanisms, causing a 
subsequent reduction in shareholders’ wealth (Cespa and Cestone, 2007). With the 
implementation of a social responsible policy a manager set on entrenchment retains the 
confidence of stakeholders who generally acquire certain powers to promote or penalize top 9 
 
executives (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1998; Hellwig, 2000; Rowley and Berman, 2000). 
Then, it will be difficult for displeased shareholders to remove such manager because they 
would have to face pressure from the non-shareholder stakeholders. Additionally, by 
colluding with stakeholders, the manager reduces a firm’s attractiveness to potential raiders 
(Pagano and Volpin, 2005).  
All these arguments suggest that firms engaging in citizenship practices bear costs 
that increase their default risk, which will be translated into higher loan spreads. 
Remarkably, an underlying hypothesis in the previous arguments connecting a 
borrower’s CSR and its loan financing costs is that banks are neutral regarding CSR. Banks, 
however, are also corporations that can have their own social agenda to promote and thus 
their own interpretation of CSR as an informative signal of a borrower’s commitment and 
ability for attending their loan obligations. 
Our contribution to the literature is that firm’s engagement in citizenship activities 
will lead to lower spreads depending upon the congruence between a borrower’s social 
responsible behavior and lenders’ preferences over such social actions, process and 
outcomes. Incongruence of preferences reflects the situation where lenders perceive the 
deployment of resources away from core firm’s activities toward CSR activities as wasteful 
managerial excess that damages firm’s financial performance. In such context, investments in 
CSR lead to lower financial performance, thereby leading banks to demand higher spreads on 
loans to socially responsible corporations. Contrarily, similar preferences regarding 
citizenship activities between borrowers and lenders decrease the perceived intensity of 
information asymmetry and moral hazard problems, thus leading to better contractual terms 
for the borrower reflected by smaller spreads.  10 
 
3. DATA DESCRIPTION 
Our sample is composed of 175 different corporations that operate in 16 different 
countries for the period 2003-2006. For these corporations, we have information on social 
responsibility, as well as a complete characterization of the syndicated loans in which each 
borrower participates. Also, we have information on the social responsibility of the banks that 
lend to these corporations through a syndicated loan arrangement. The information compiled 
is composed of 4 different databases. 
First, for the information on social responsibility, we use SiRi PRO
TM  database. 
These data are compiled by the Sustainable Investment Research International Company 
(SiRi) – the world’s largest company specializing in the analysis of socially responsible 
investment, based in Europe, North America, and Australia. SiRi comprises eleven 
independent research institutions, such as KLD Research and Analytics in the USA, which 
are coordinated from the SiRi’s headquarters, located at Freiburg, Switzerland.
4 For each 
company, there is a detailed, 20-to-30 page profile based on common methodology. The 
profile contains 199 items on the leading international corporations.
5 Items are extracted from 
multiples sources such as financial accounts, company documentation, databases, media 
reports, interviews with stakeholders, and ongoing contact with managers. SiRi translates this 
information into a comprehensive format—a rating—by implementing Likert-type scales and 
then grouping these scales into eight research sections, with an additional section containing 
general information about the company (location, number of employees, total turnover, etc.). 
                                                 
4 www.siricompany.com for more information. 
5 www.centreinfo.ch/doc/doc_site/SP-Novartis-06.pdf for an example of a detailed profile, and 
www.ais.com.es/ingles/productos/derivados.htm#1 for more information on SiRi Pro
TM. 11 
 
The first research section provides a description of ethical and unethical corporate activities 
such as political donations, corruption and bribery, and the existence of business ethics 
programs addressing these issues. The last section measures the degree of involvement in 
controversial business activities like gambling, alcohol, pornography, animal testing, and 
tobacco. Participation in any one of these controversial activities is reason for exclusion from 
the SiRi sustainability index. The remaining six sections cover various issues related to 
distinct stakeholder groups (community, customers, employees, corporate governance, 
suppliers, and environment). For each stakeholder, the database addresses firm’s attributes 
such as the level of transparency and disclosure; the existence of corporate policies and 
principles related to stakeholder; the importance of management procedures; and the level of 
stakeholder disputes. In each of these areas, the information on the various items is translated 
into a Likert-type scale score. Importantly, each item is sector and time-specific weighted. 
For example, “environment” is weighted more heavily for energy companies than it is for 
companies in the financial services industry. The final score provided by SiRi is the sum of 
each of the scores assigned to the 199 items, averaged by corresponding weight and rated on 
a scale from 0 (worst) to 100 (best).  
Second, OSIRIS provides data on financial and ownership structure for borrowers. 
This is a database compiled by Bureau van Dijk (BvD) and provides information on financial, 
ownership and earnings for 38,000 companies from over 130 countries. 
Third, the LPC Reuters DealScan database provides detailed data on loans made all 
over the world by banks to large firms. Such loan level information includes various 
characteristics of the loan contracts such as lender and borrower identities, dates of 12 
 
origination, purpose of loan, deal amounts, number of lenders, lender deal share, spread 
margins, loan maturity, covenants, and borrower sector and ratings.  
Last, bank-level characteristics are collected from the Bankscope database, and 
matched with the aforementioned loan deal information. Raw data from DealScan was 
filtered to allow only confirmed loans, and to exclude loans made to firms in the financial and 
public sectors (first digit of SIC code equal to 6 or 9). These loans are dropped because the 
risks of firms in these sectors are argued to be very different from other firms, as they are 
likely to be government owned and government protected monopolies (Qian and Strahan, 
2007). Our sample selection consists of taking, whenever possible, the 15 largest commercial 
banks or banking holding companies in terms of total assets, in 38 of the 49 countries 
included in the study of La Porta et al (1998). Besides establishing a limit in the number of 
countries included in the study, we believe that such selection allows comparability with 
other cross-country studies, mainly related to the “law and finance” literature. 
Once we have crossed these 4 databases, we are left with an international sample of 
borrowers and lenders whose distribution by country of origin is shown in Table 1.  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
Table 1 shows a similar dispersion of countries between borrowers and lenders: there 
are 16 different countries for borrowers and 15 for lenders. Also, among the 4,554 different 
facilities for which we have information on the CSR of lenders as well as of borrowers, in 
462 (9.35%) there is a coincidence between the lenders’ country of origin and that of the 
borrower. These figures suggest that home bias for the syndicated loan market is not very 
important in our study.  13 
 
In order to give a panel structure to the data, we have aggregated all the facilities 
involving each firm, on a yearly basis. Such aggregation is conducted by weighting the values 
of the different variables (i.e., loan spreads, maturity and the like) in each facility by a weight 
that is equal to the funds granted to each facility averaged by the total financing of the firm.
6  
3.2. Measuring the CSR of borrowers and lenders, and the cost of debt financing  
SiRi PRO
TM  rating is used to measure lenders and borrowers CSR. In addition to 
providing a final overall rating, the database provides a score for each stakeholder.  
Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Hillman and Keim, 2001), we consider six stakeholder 
dimensions: community, customers, employees, corporate governance, suppliers, and 
environment. We therefore measure corporate social responsibility as the weighted sum of 
scores of these six stakeholder groups, using the corresponding SiRi weights.  Note that these 
dimensions are similar to those of the KLD data (e.g., Goss and Roberts, 2007). The outcome 
is an index that can take any value between 0 and 100. 
The cost of debt financing is measured using the yield spread (Cost_Capital). This 
variable describes the amount the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR for each dollar 
drawn down. It adds the spread of the loan with any annual (or facility) fee paid to the bank 
group. This variable is the weighted average of all loans spreads borne by a borrower in one 
year, weighted by the facility amount (this variable is defined as All-in Spread Drawn in 
DealScan). All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
                                                 
6 For example, if firm i receives 1 million funds in year t through 3 facilities of amounts 0.1, 0.3 and 0.6 million 
and spreads of 30, 40 and 60 basis points respectively; then, we compute the mean spread for firm i in year t as 
0.1 30 0.3 40 0.6 60 ´ + ´ + ´  basis points. We used such procedure to compute annual firm-level values of 
the different variables of the facility. 14 
 
3.3. Control Variables Measures 
We introduce various controls to account for borrower and lender rating, 
characteristics of the syndicated loan (duration, collateral, and number of lenders), firm’s 
characteristics (growth opportunities, intangible assets, size, age, leverage, profitability, and 
ownership structure).  
Borrower_Rating. These ratings represent firms’ financial strength. As in Goss and 
Roberts (2007), the higher the rating, the lower the default probability, and the lower should 
be the expected loan rate.  
Lender_Rating. For this rating, there are two opposite effects that may explain its 
impact on loan rates. On the one hand, most efficient banks are better able to discriminate 
among high quality and low quality firms, thus allowing lenders to reduce rates. On the other 
hand, credit agencies may grant higher ratings to those lenders with high loan rates since this 
may reflect borrowers willing to pay higher rates to banks exhibiting higher reputation as 
documented in Kim, Kristiansen and Vale (2005). 
Maturity. There are opposite effects that explain the effect of maturity on loan rates. 
First, the “trade-off” hypothesis (Gottesman and Roberts, 2004) argues that longer maturities 
imply higher risk for the lender and, consequently, lenders will charge higher rates. In this 
line, Flannery’s (1986) focuses on borrowers and argues that sound borrowers would prefer 
to obtain short-term funds with low rates as a signaling mechanism. Hence, both theories 
suggest a positive and monotonic risk-maturity relation. On the other hand, some authors 
(Dennis, Nandy and Sharpe, 2000) document that longer maturity is a signal of good credit 
quality, which, should be translated in a reduction of the loan rate. Empirically, Berger, 
Espinoza-Vega, Frame and Miller (2005), among others, find that risky borrowers use short-15 
 
term debt, whereas higher credit quality firms use longer maturities. Finally, Diamond (1991) 
synthesizes both views and predicts a non-monotonic, inversely U-shaped relation between 
borrower risk and debt maturity. While low risk and the very risky borrowers have short 
maturities, the medium risk borrowers choose long-term finance. 
Collateral. There are opposing arguments explaining the effect of collateral on loan 
rates. The trade-off hypothesis (Gottesman and Roberts, 2004) suggests that collateral 
reduces risk. However, the “credit quality” hypothesis (Dennis, Nandy and Sharpe, 2000) 
suggest that precisely because credits are risky and have larger rates, lenders require 
collateral. Also, Manove, Padilla and Pagano (2001) find that collateral induces banks to be 
lazy monitors, ultimately increasing banks’ risk. 
Number_Lenders. A leader in a syndicate may want to increase the number of 
participants if credit is risky (risk sharing), according to the signaling hypothesis (Dennis, 
Nandy and Sharpe, 2000). However, Gomes and Novaes (2005), although in a context of 
banks as shareholders, suggest that the larger the number of lenders, the lower the 
expropriation incentives, which will translate to lower loan rates. 
Market_to_Book. Such variable is a standard proxy of growth opportunities (Smith 
and Watts, 1992) given that it captures the value of long-term investments like intangibles, as 
explained in Dowell, Hart, and Yeung (2000). Then, such variable may determine a firm’s cost of 
capital and it is also closely related to a firm’s CSR (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000). Thus, the 
inclusion of such a variable will eliminate a source of spurious correlation between CSR and the 
cost of capital. 
Intangibility. This variable is complementary to Market_to_Book because growth 
firms tend to have a large proportion of intangible assets. Also, such variable captures the 16 
 
existence of a risk factor linked to information asymmetries given that investors tend to 
overreact to intangible information (Daniel and Titman, 2006). 
Size.  There are two countervailing effects this variable may induce. On the one hand, 
larger firms have higher reputation (Diamond, 1991); have more stable cash-flows and are 
less opaque and thus have larger bargaining power to obtain better financial conditions 
(Strahan, 1999). On the other hand, large firms may be "too-big-to-fail", generating serious 
agency problems (moral hazard). The reputation argument would suggest a negative effect of 
size on loan rates, while the moral hazard argument, suggests a positive impact. 
Age. This variable is a proxy for reputation (Diamond, 1991), as only the most 
efficient firms survive in the long run. Then, we expect a negative relationship between that 
variable and the cost of capital. 
Debt_to_Equity. The standard agency theory (Jensen, 1986) suggests the debt has a 
positive effect on risk as it reduces agency problems linked to managerial discretion. 
However, debt also stimulates risk-shifting behavior (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Then, the 
final effect on the cost of capital is an empirical issue. 
Profitability. We expect that more profitable firms obtain better financing conditions 
(Strahan, 1999). 
Blockholders_Stake. The presence of institutional shareholders has two countervailing 
effects. On the one hand, they confer financial soundness onto firms, which should reduce the 
loan spread. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) find that institutional ownership is negatively 
associated with yields on public bonds. On the other hand, it is well known (Morck, Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1988) that blockholders tend to expropriate minority shareholders. Hence, 
lenders may want to reduce the expropriating rents by charging higher rates.  17 
 
3.4. Descriptive and univariate statistics 
Table 2 displays means, standard deviations, and correlations of the variables used in 
the study.  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------- 
Data show that, on average, lenders have larger values of CSR than borrowers (62.56 
versus 56.59 respectively). Concerning borrowers characteristics, the average borrower has 
34,000 million € in assets, is 20 years old since being listed on the stock market, has a ROA 
of 13.8%, a leverage of 63.7%, a proportion of 18.2% in intangible assets, and the combined 
stake of its 10 largest block holders is 49.85%. Concerning to the specifics of the syndicated 
loans, the collateral requirements are almost non-existent, the average maturity of the loans is 
22.7 months, and the average number of lenders is almost 10 (9.79). Such information shows 
that firms participating in this market are mature and with good financial indicators. Both 
features indicate that the level of information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders is 
low and, therefore, the potential benefits of CSR as an informative signal for reducing 
financing costs would be lower. Hence, the results we provide represent quite a conservative 
and a lower bound of the connection between CSR and borrowers’ cost of capital. 
The analysis of correlations shows that the CSR of both borrowers and lenders is 
negatively correlated with the average syndicated loans’ rate. Results depicted in Table 2 also 
document a negative relationship between borrowers’ and lenders’ bond ratings and the cost 
of debt financing. We also find a positive correlation between CSR and bond ratings, a result 
that may indicate that rating agencies take CSR as a credible signal. This evidence 
demonstrates the importance of including bond ratings in the estimations of loan rates in 18 
 
order to avoid spurious correlation between such a variable and borrowers’ CSR based on 
their mutual connection with bond rating. Loan maturity is positively correlated with loan 
rates, consistent with higher risks involved with long-term loans. Also, and consistently with 
the information value of CSR as a signal of trust, social responsible borrowers are rewarded 
with longer-duration loans (correlation of 10.1%). Moreover, social responsible lenders are 
positively correlated with loans’ maturity (correlation of 9.7%). Such result is consistent with 
the social dimension of certain lenders, like S&L, which try to support certain firms by giving 
them some slack (longer length in the loans). Such result may also be explained by the 
existence of a matching between social responsible lenders and social responsible borrowers 
(although the correlation between Borrower_CSR and Lender_CSR is just 3%).  
In order to provide first initial evidence of the relationship between CSR and different 
loan characteristics, we conduct (Table 3) a series of t-tests to assess the differences between 
responsible (borrowers with a CSR above the sample mean) and irresponsible (borrowers 
with a CSR below the mean) borrowers. We repeated these analyses for lenders. Figures in 
Table 3 show that the cost of capital is lower when the social responsibility of borrowers and 
of lenders is above the mean (43.7 versus 53.5 basis points, in the case of borrowers, and 43.7 
versus 54.3, in the case of lenders). The difference in the loan rates between responsible and 
irresponsible agents (both borrowers and lenders) is roughly 10 basis points, and it is 
statistically significant at 10% level of significance (two-tailed test). Remarkably, these 
differences in the cost of capital are independent of the identity of the agent: borrowers or 
lenders. In the regression analysis to follow, we extend this analysis by examining the 
interaction between borrowers’ and lenders’ social responsibility. Meanwhile, the analysis 
presented in Panel B provides a preliminary evidence of the combined effect of borrower and 19 
 
lender social responsibility. In this analysis, we assess the differences in loan rates when 
different types of borrowers contract with different types of lenders. Our results indicate that 
increases in lenders’ CSR from below the sample mean to above the sample mean is 
associated with a larger reduction in loan rates in comparison with similar increases in 
borrowers’ CRS. In particular, data show that when there is an increase in the lenders’ CSR 
from below the sample mean to above that mean and the borrowers’ CSR is above the sample 
mean, there is a significant decrease in the syndicated loan rate (from 51.1 basis points to 
39.20 with a p-value of 0.08). However, this does not hold when the increase is in the 
borrowers’ CSR from below to above the mean. In that case there is a non-significant 
decrease in loan rate from 47.4 to 39.2 when lenders’ CSR is above the corresponding mean 
and from 59.6 to 51.1 when lenders’ CSR is below the corresponding mean. Hence, it seems 
that an analysis of the effect of social responsibility on a firm’s cost of capital should 
critically incorporate information of lenders’ CSR. 
The analysis of other contractual dimensions of debt financing reveals that loan 
maturity is longer when borrowers’ CSR is above the mean (25.1 versus 19.9 months for 
socially irresponsible borrowers; although the p-value >0.10) and when lenders are socially 
responsible too (28.6 versus 15.8 months for irresponsible banks; with a p-value of 0.00). 
These results are consistent with the existence of a matching between social responsible 
borrowers and lenders. In fact, data show some evidence in that direction given that the 
superior CSR scores of those firms that borrow capital from lenders whose CSR scores are 
larger than the sample mean. Additionally, social responsible borrowers pledge lower 
collateral and borrow capital through syndicates with a larger number of members. This later 
result strengthen evidence presented in Sufi (2007), who demonstrates that borrowers with 20 
 
strong reputations obtain syndicated loans from more dispersed syndicates and that the lead 
bank retains a smaller share of the loan. A reputable socially responsible borrower may prefer 
borrowing from different financial institutions because this can reduce informational capture. 
Once the other lenders in the syndicate acquire information on the borrowers’ trustworthiness 
as a social responsible firm, they may be willing to provide future loans at lower rates to that 
social responsible firm. Social responsible lenders also prefer lending through syndicates with 
a larger number of participants.  
Finally, data indicate that social responsible borrowers as well as social responsible 
lenders exhibit superior bond ratings. Thus, it seems that the most solvent institutions—
lenders as well as borrowers—are those which follow social responsible practices. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
--------------------------------- 
4. MULTIVARIATE RESULTS 
4.1. Econometric specifications 
In the basic specification we test the cross-sectional relation of the syndicated loan 
spread with borrowers’ and lenders’ CSR and control measures (see Berger and Udell, 1995; 
Guedes and Oppler, 1996, among others) as follows: 
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It is important to keep in mind that in this type of estimation, there are two potential 
endogeneity problems that should be addressed. First, the unobservable heterogeneity that is 
time invariant ( i h ) may be correlated with some of the explanatory variables. For example, 
the talent of a manager is not fully captured by the explanatory variables and may be related 
to, both, firms’ cost of capital as well as to borrowers’ CSR. Fixed-effect estimation 
(estimation in differences) may eliminate this problem. Second, there is a potential problem 
of reverse causality given that a firm’s cost of capital may be a driver of a firm’s CSR 
according to the slack resources hypothesis (Waddock and Graves, 1997). In order to prevent 
this (second) endogeneity problem which is particularly acute when combined with the first 
one, we lead the dependent variable (Cost_Capital) by one period, and instrument 
Borrower_CSR in a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, we estimate a specification of 
Borrower_CSR in terms of different firms’ characteristics, including: Borrower_Rating; 
Market_to_Book; Size; Age; Debt-to-Equity; Profitability; Intangibility, and 
Blockholder_Stake. In the second stage, we use the prediction of the previous specification as 
the instrument of Borrower_CSR in the new specification of the loan rate regression. Such 
instrument produces consistent estimates given that, with such prediction, we have eliminated 
the error term which incorporates the effect of loan rate on the borrower social responsibility. 
To accommodate possible curvilinear relationship between CSR and financial 
performance (Barnett and Salomon, 2006; Wang, Choi and Li, 2005), we investigate the 
existence of non-linearities between CSR and a firm’s cost of capital by introducing in some 
of the specifications a quadratic term for the Borrower_CSR namely, Borrower_CSR
2. 
Alternatively, we include a dummy variable (High_Borrower_CSR) for separating those 
firms whose CSR is above the sample mean (High_Borrower_CSR=1) from those below that 22 
 
mean (High_Borrower_CSR=0). Additionally, we test the robustness of our results to 
different legal environments by crossing the variable Borrower_CSR with a set of dummies 
(English, French and German) that describe the origin of their legal codes according to La 
Porta et al. (1998). English=1 when borrower’s country is one of the following: Australia; 
Canada; Great Britain; Chile; USA. French=1 when that borrower’s country is one of the 
following: Belgium; Spain; France; Greece; Italy; Netherland; Portugal. German=1 indicates 
that borrower’s country is one of the following: Switzerland; Germany and Austria.  
Finally, we study the possible existence of interaction effects between borrowers’ 
CSR and lenders’ CSR, as discussed earlier. We model the interaction in two scenarios. 
Under the first scenario, we hypothesize that the effect of borrowers’ CSR on loan rates is 
moderated by lenders’ CSR. We capture such moderating effect through the interactive 
variable Borrower_CSR×High_Lender_CSR that crosses the variable Borrower_CSR with 
the dummy variable High_Lender_CSR, which is equal to 1 (0) when lenders’ CSR is above 
(below) the sample mean. Alternatively, we explore a hypothetical complementarity between 
borrowers’ and lenders’ CSR. We have argued previously that only social responsible lenders 
correctly interpret the CSR signal of their borrowers and translate such information into 
reduced loan rates. We study such issue with a set of interactive dummy variables, 
High_Borrower×High_Lender; High_Borrower×Low_Lender, and 
Low_Borrower×High_Lender, that compare scenarios in which lenders and/or borrowers 
have scores on social responsibility above the sample mean with a scenario in which neither 
borrowers, nor lenders, have a value above the sample mean 
(Low_Borrower×Low_Lender=1). A significant coefficient on the variable 
High_Borrower×High_Lender and non-significant in the remaining interactive dummies is 23 
 
indicative that both large values of borrowers’ CSR as well as of lenders’ CSR are necessary 
for finding significant effects on the loan rates (complementary relationship). 
4.2. Evidence on yield spreads with socially responsible contracting parties 
Table 4 investigates whether borrowers’ CSR influences the cost of debt financing. 
Column 1 shows results of specification (1), but without including the variable Lender_CSR. 
Column 2 includes the aforementioned Borrower_CSR
2 variable exploring non-linearities. To 
study the robustness of our results to different legal environments, column 3 includes the 
aforementioned interactive variables that cross Borrower_CSR with the dummies (English, 
French and German) classifying countries according to their legal origin. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
--------------------------------- 
Results presented in column 1 suggest that changes in borrowers’ CSR lead to a 
reduction in the loan spreads in the following period (-0.152 with p=0.06), which confirms 
the main contention of the paper. In terms of the economic significance of such coefficient, 
one standard deviation of borrowers’ CSR leads to a reduction of 1.8 basis point (-0.15×12), 
representing a reduction of 3.7% over the mean spread (48.8 basis points). Once, we study 
non-linear effects (column 2), we find the existence of an inverted U-shape relationship 
between Borrower_CSR and Cost_Capital. In particular, when borrowers’ CSR is beyond 
34.6%
7, that is, above the 5% lower tail of the Borrower_CSR distribution, there is a 
significant effect of CSR in reducing the Cost_Capital. Finally, column 3 indicates that the 
                                                 
7 This is the result of Coefficient of Borrower_CSR/(2 × coefficient of Borrower_CSR
 2)= 0.395/(2 × 0.571)= 
0.346. 24 
 
negative effect of borrowers’ CSR on loan rates holds independently of the origin of 
borrowers’ country legal code. 
Concerning the control variables, in column 3 we find that collateral requirements 
reduces the loan rates, while maturity and number of lenders increases it (coefficients of 
0.282 with p=0.07 and 0.193 with p=0.01, respectively). We have argued that riskier loans 
(e.g., with longer maturity) trigger leading banks to include additional members in the 
syndicated loan as a way of diversifying risks. Focusing on firms’ characteristics, larger and 
younger firms (growth firms) and firms with lager market-to-book ratios bear higher loan 
rates (coefficients of 2.413 with p=0.01; -2.318 with p=0.05 and 0.044 with p=0.01, 
respectively). Regarding lenders’ characteristics, results indicate that high-rated lenders 
charge lower rates (coefficient of -0.246 with p=0.05), which is consistent with the 
contingency analysis shown in Table 3. 
Table 5 incorporates the lenders’ CSR into econometric specifications. In column 1, 
the lenders’ CSR is included without interactive terms, while in column 2 it is included as a 
moderator through the interactive term Borrower_CSR×High_Lender_CSR. Column 3 
focuses on significant changes in borrowers’ and lenders’ CSR through the dummy variables 
High_Borrower_CSR and High_Lender_CSR that are equal to 1 (0) when Borrower_CSR and 
Lender_CSR is above (below) the sample mean, respectively. Finally in column 4, we study 
the interaction between borrowers’ CSR and that of lenders through the aforementioned 
variables High_Borrower×High_Lender; High_Borrower×Low_Lender; and 
Low_Borrower×High_Lender. The previous variables are equal to 1, when both components 
of the dummies that define each of them are equal to 1. By construction, the coefficients of 
these dummies are differential effects with respect to the reference control group that 25 
 
corresponds to those facilities in which borrowers and lender have a value of CSR below the 
sample mean (Low_Borrower×Low_Lender=1). 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
--------------------------------- 
Table 5 shows that both borrowers’ and lenders’ CSR are significant determinants of 
the reduction in loan rates (coefficients of -0.127 with p=.01 and -0.124 with p=0.07 
respectively). Remarkably, once we consider the interaction between both variables (column 
4), we find that only when borrowers’ CSR as well as lenders’ are above the sample mean, 
there is a significant effect on reducing the syndicated loan rate. This indicates that it is very 
important to incorporate variables of lender’s CSR in any analysis of the financing effects of 
borrower’s CSR. Concerning the control variables, the results are consistent with those 
presented in Table 4. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
--------------------------------- 
Finally, in Table 6 we replicate the analysis conducted in Table 5 but instrumenting 
the variable of Borrower_CSR by its predicted value.
8 Once we focus on the specification 
presented in column 1, we find that, both, increases in borrower’s CSR as well as lender’s 
CSR lead to a reduction in loan spreads. In particular, one unit standard deviation in 
Borrower_CSR leads to a reduction in 2.1 basis points in loan spread (-0.182×12). Also, one 
unit standard deviation in Lender_CSR leads to a reduction in 2.8 basis points in loan spread 
(-0.406×6.84). Then, both, lenders’ CSR as well as borrowers’ CSR are significant 
                                                 
8  We  have  also  instrumented  the  variable  Lender_CSR  following  the  same  two-stage  procedure  used  for 
instrumenting Borrower_CSR indicating similar qualitative results to those displayed in Table 6. 26 
 
determinants of syndicated loan spreads. Column 2 indicates that when lender’s CSR is above 
the mean of the sample (Lender_CSR=1), there is an additional reduction of 2 basis point for 
one standard deviation in borrower’s CSR (-0.169×12). Finally, we explore the 
complementarity between both variables in column 4. The result shows that there are two 
situations in which there is a decrease in the loan rates. First, when, both, borrowers’ as well 
as lenders’ CSR are above the sample mean (coefficient of -1.070 with p=0.01). Second, 
when lenders’ CSR is above the sample mean and borrowers’ CRS is below it (coefficient -
0.382 with p=0.02). Thus, the participation of a social responsible lender in a syndicated loan 
is even more important than that of social responsible borrowers for achieving the reduction 
in the loan rate. Such a result confirms the critical importance of incorporating both 
borrowers’ as well as lenders social responsibility in determining the effect on the cost of 
capital. 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper extends the traditional vision of the linkage between a firm’s corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) and its financing-investment decisions. Previous literature 
(Waddock and Graves, 1997; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001) has concentrated exclusively on the 
social responsible behavior of borrowing firms, while ignoring that of other stakeholders such 
as debtholders, which are capital providers. Such focus on the borrowers’ side is striking 
because a firm’s cost of capital, which is a major driver of a firm’s financial performance, is 
the outcome of a bargaining process between lenders and borrowers and in which lenders 
usually have larger bargaining power compared to that of borrowers. Moreover, such 
bargaining process is conduced in an informationally asymmetric environment in which the 27 
 
emergence of signals reducing such information problems would be highly valuable in order 
to reduce borrowers’ financing costs. Notable, one could expect much stronger results when 
the degree of asymmetric information is larger as is among more opaque unrated firms. In 
such a context, lenders can interpret the social responsible behavior of borrowers as a 
credible signal of their trustworthiness and thus will reward borrowers with lower loan rates 
(in the case of debtholders) or lower cost of equity (in the case of shareholders). For equity 
financing, the literature has shown (Margolis and Walsh, 2003; and Orlitzky, et. al., 2003) 
that social responsible firms generate larger shareholders’ returns. Then, as equity prices 
increase, the cost of new equity financing decreases. Such logic also applies for debt 
financing. 
Our paper follows this research tradition but goes a step forward by introducing the 
linkage between CSR and the cost of capital, the social sensibility of capital providers. Our 
view is that borrowers’ CSR investment can only be a valuable signal that will trigger 
reductions in the cost of capital if capital providers are able of interpreting such signal in a 
positive way. Obviously, such “interpretation” requires from capital providers a sensibility in 
social issues. Hence, our main hypothesis is that when capital providers are also social 
responsible institutions, borrowers with high rating in CSR will obtain lower cost of capital. 
Summarizing our results, we find first, a reduction in 2.1 basis points in the loan 
spreads when borrower’s CSR increases by one standard deviation. Second, a reduction in 2.8 
basis points in syndicated loan spreads when lender’s CSR increases by one standard 
deviation. Third, there is an additional reduction of 2 basis point for one standard deviation in 
borrower’s CSR, if lender’s CSR is above the sample mean. Finally, in analyzing the 
complementarity between borrower’s and lender’s ethical postures, we find that there are two 28 
 
situations in which a reduction in loan spreads emerge: (1) when both lenders as well as 
borrowers are at a CSR levels above the sample mean; and (2) when the lender shows high 
score in social responsibility, independently of borrowers’ CSR. Thus, the social 
responsibility awareness of lenders is of utmost importance for the provision of lower cost of 
capital and further be enhanced when matched with high social responsibility borrower 
awareness. 
5.1. Implications for research 
An explanation for the dispersion of results connecting financial performance and 
social performance can be derived from our analysis. Here, we have introduced the social 
responsibility of capital providers as an additional element in the specification explaining 
borrowers’ cost of capital, in order to alleviate the problem identified by McWilliams and 
Siegel (2000). These authors argue that the relationships between financial performance 
(inversely related to cost of capital) and CSR may be spurious, and simply the result of the 
mutual connection of these variables with other omitted elements. We propose to treat social 
awareness of both contracting parties in the specification. Lenders CSR turns out to be an 
important factor, not only in the determination of loan rates, which also influence firm’s 
financial performance, but also in its facilitation of the matching of similar borrowers and 
lenders along the social awareness dimension. Ignoring such dimension in the specification 
may indeed generate spurious correlations and inconsistent results. 
5.2. Implications for practice 
We suggest that the best way to stimulate firms to embrace social responsibility 
principles in a pure instrumental way is, paradoxically, emphasizing the social dimension of 29 
 
capital providers, particularly that of lenders. Only social responsible firms obtain the most 
tangible fruits from their social responsible efforts through lower loan rates if lenders are also 
social responsible institutions and “understand” such social dimension. Undoubtedly the 
current turmoil that have put banks on the spotlight for their malpractices, open a clear 
opportunity for achieving such issues. 
5.3. Limitations and Future Research 
In qualifying our conclusions, we recognize some weaknesses in our study.  First, 
although we believe that the SiRi database improves the measurement of CSR, it is not free 
from criticism.  The CSR index of SiRi aggregates multiple social dimensions, for example, 
with no theoretical basis for assuming that they are correlated (Waddock and Graves, 1997; 
Rowley and Berman, 2000). Disaggregating such score in order to find what specific 
component of CSR is the most significant in order to convince social responsible lenders of 
borrowers’ trustworthiness is a natural extension of our paper. A second extension is to 
contemplate other forms of financing apart from syndicated loans. The extant literature 
suggests that syndicated loans are positioned between two extremes, having characteristics of 
both sole-lender bank loans and public debt (Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000). As may be 
expected, the information value of the social responsible signal may even be greater when 
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Appendix 1: Definition of the variables  
Dependent Variables   
Cost_Capital 
 
Describes the amount the borrower pays in basis points over 
LIBOR for each dollar drawn down. It adds the spread of the loan 
with any annual (or facility) fee paid to the bank group. This 
variable is the weighted average of all loans spreads borne by a 
borrower in one year, weighted by the facility amount (this 
variable is defined as All-in Spread Drawn in DealScan). 
Main explanatory Variables:   
Borrower_CSR  SiRi score for borrowers’ CSR. This score is the sum of 
each of the scores assigned to the 199 items that cover 
different social issues, averaged by corresponding weight 
for the different stakeholders(community, customers, 
employees, corporate governance, suppliers, and 
environment) and rated on a scale from 0 (worst) to 100 
(best). 
Lender_CSR  SiRi score for lenders’ CSR computed following the same 
pattern as Borrower_CSR. 
Control variables:   
Age  The number of years since first listed. 
Borrower_Rating  Moodys rating on borrowers’ riskiness. In particular, following 
Qian and Strahan (2007), this variable consists of an index 
ranging from 1 to 6, representing the Moody’s senior debt 
rating at the close of the loan. When Moody’s ratings are 
missing, S&P ratings are used. The index equal to 1 
represents a rating of “Aaa”, 2 indicates “Aa”, and 6 
indicates “B” or worse. If there is no rating information for 
the borrower, zero is assigned to this variable, and a 
separate indicator for unrated borrowers is included. Source: 
DealScan. 
Collateral  Dummy that is equal to 1 if the loan requires a collateral and zero 
otherwise. 
Debt_to_Equity  Book value of debt divided by total assets. 
Intangibility  The ratio of intangible assets to total assets. 
Lender_Rating  S&P ratings on lenders’ riskiness. In particular, S&P level A 
corresponds to a level of 63, while D corresponds to 1. If 
there is no rating information for the lender, zero is assigned 
to this variable, and a separate indicator for unrated lenders 
is included. Source: DealScan. 
Leverage  The debt-to-equity ratio. 
Market_to_Book  Market equity value to equity book value. 
Maturity  Maturity (in months) of the facility. 
Number_Lenders  Number of lenders participating in the facility. 
Blockholders_Stake  The stake of the 10 largest blockholders (%). 36 
 
Profitability  Operating income divided by total assets. 
Size  Total assets. 37 
 






















  LENDERS’ COUNTRY 
  AU  BE  CA  CH  DE  DK  ES  FR  GR  GB  IT  NL  NO  SE  US    Total 
AU  7  2  0  19  37  0  3  16  0  0  0  7  0  0  11    102 
BE  0  2  0  0  0  0  2  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  1    8 
CA  0  0  19  4  10  0  0  22  0  0  0  6  0  0  4    65 
CH  0  6  0  12  26  5  3  30  0  0  11  7  0  0  2    102 
CL  0  3  3  0  6  3  7  4  0  0  5  4  0  0  2    37 
DE  2  4  2  19  96  1  12  49  0  0  10  31  7  13  35    281 
ES  0  1  2  9  38  2  33  24  0  0  14  18  0  0  11    152 
FI  0  4  0  1  11  7  0  5  0  0  0  7  5  11  3    54 
FR  9  11  22  9  82  12  48  92  0  7  17  52  3  1  17    382 
GB  18  14  41  16  84  37  30  72  1  24  33  56  5  14  27    472 
GR  0  0  0  4  4  0  2  3  2  0  0  4  0  0  4    23 
NL  0  5  0  1  12  2  5  5  0  0  1  12  0  0  6    49 
NO  3  4  0  3  14  12  2  11  0  0  0  4  14  15  5    87 
PT  0  2  2  0  9  0  2  5  0  0  2  6  0  0  3    31 
SE  0  0  0  0  4  3  5  2  0  0  2  0  1  6  0    23 
US  107  36  434  152  501  28  119  643  0  15  107  364  15  46  119    2,686 
                                   
Total  146  94  525  249  934  112  273  986  3  46  202  578  50  106  250    4,554 
1 In the horizontal axis, there is the distribution of facilities by borrowers’ country, while in the vertical axis 
there  is  the  distribution  by  lenders’  country.  AU=Australia;  BE=Belgium;  CA=Canada;  CH=Switzerland; 
CL=Chile; DE=Germany; DK=Denmark; ES=Spain; FI=Finland; FR=France; GB=Great Britain; GR=Greece; 




Table 2: Table of Means and Correlation Matrix 
1 
    Mean  S. D.  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15 
1  Cost_Capital  48.797  41.288  1.000                             
2  Borrower_CSR  56.591  12.009  -0.050  1.000                           
3  Lender_CSR  62.533  6.846  -0.015  0.029  1.000                         
4  Collateral  0.0101  0.103  0.257  0.055  -0.080  1.000                       
5  Borrower_Rating  1.659  1.800  -0.077  -0.079  0.154  0.096  1.000                     
6  Lender_Rating  24.269  25.480  -0.167  0.175  0.056  -0.100  -0.694  1.000                   
7  Maturity  22.722  26.508  0.011  0.101  0.097  0.005  -0.612  0.681  1.000                 
8  Number_Lenders  9.791  11.471  -0.090  0.134  -0.076  -0.035  -0.602  0.669  0.598  1.000               
9  Market_to_Book  2.533  23.500  0.117  -0.059  0.134  -0.011  0.089  -0.088  -0.066  -0.079  1.000             
10  Size (10
6)  34.000  58.800  0.143  0.244  -0.030  -0.053  -0.205  0.201  0.094  0.187  -0.054  1.000           
11  Age  20.189  19.153  -0.042  -0.093  -0.088  -0.069  -0.059  -0.037  -0.001  0.059  -0.024  0.053  1.000         
12  Debt_to_Equity  0.637  0.171  0.012  0.087  -0.121  0.046  -0.233  0.089  0.198  0.239  -0.220  0.259  0.065  1.000       
13  Profitability  0.138  0.103  0.056  -0.008  0.146  0.010  0.182  -0.103  -0.099  -0.149  0.109  -0.143  0.025  -0.171  1.000     
14  Intangibility  0.182  0.159  -0.110  -0.252  -0.050  -0.007  -0.091  0.054  0.032  0.012  -0.039  -0.039  0.172  -0.075  -0.183  1.000   
15  Blockholders_Stake  49.852  46.272  0.031  0.125  -0.154  0.113  0.112  -0.069  -0.033  -0.043  -0.103  -0.161  -0.161  0.129  0.012  -0.134  1.000 
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Table 3: Contingency Analysis 
PANEL A
1 
  CSR_Borrower=1 CSR_Borrower=0  CSR_Lender=1  CSR_Lender=0 
Cost_Capital  43.711  53.569  43.746  54.307 
T-test  (0.085)  (0.083) 
Lender_CSR  0.544  0.494     
T-test  (0.183)   
Borrower_CSR      0.401  0.354 
T-test    (0.183) 
Maturity  25.137  19.973  28.675  15.849 
T-test  (0.186)  (0.000) 
Collateral  0.352  1.394  0.000  2.247 
T-test  (0.099)  (0.139) 
Number_Lenders  11.439  7.916  9.527  7.741 
T-test  (0.036)  (0.030) 
Borrower_Rating  1.624  1.350  1.599  1.301 
T-test  (0.033)  (0.017) 
Lender_Rating  27.238  20.890  26.753  21.074 
T-test  (0.090)  (0.003) 
PANEL B
1, 2 
  CSR_Borrower=1 CSR_Borrower=0  CSR_Lender=1  CSR_Lender=0 
  CL=1  CL=0  CL=1  CL=0  CB=1  CB=0  CB=1  CB=0 
Cost_Capital  39.197  51.144  47.437  59.579  39.197  47.437  51.144  59.579 
T-test  (0.082)  (0.217)  (0.273)  (0.403) 
 
1 P-values in parentheses. See the definition of the variables in Appendix 1. 
2 CL=1 (0) indicates that Lender_CSR to be above (below) sample mean. CB=1 (0) indicates Borrower_CSR to 
be above (below) sample mean. 40 
 
Table 4: The effect of Borrower’s CSR on the cost of capital 
1 
Table  4  reports  the  results  of  conducting  fixed-effect  regressions  on  the  syndicated  loans  cost  of  capital  in  terms  of 
borrower’s CSR as well as different controls defined in Appendix 1. The interactive terms English_CSR, French_CSR, 
German_CSR are the result of multiplying Borrower_CSR by a set of dummies: English, French and German that describe 
the origin of their legal codes according to La Porta et al. (1988). English=1 means that borrower’s country is one of the 
following: Australia; Canada; Great Britain; Chile; USA. French=1 means that borrower’s country is one of the following: 
Belgium;  Spain;  France;  Greece;  Italy;  Netherland;  Portugal.  German=1  means  that  borrower’s  country  is  one  of  the 
following: Switzerland; Germany and Austria. The coefficients are standardized and in parentheses there are the 
standard errors of each coefficient.  
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31.51%  36.24%  42.53% 
Fitness (F test)  4.72 (0.000)  4.78 (0.000)  5.36 (0.000) 
Hausman Test  180.39 (0.000)  70.18 (0.000)  149.71 (0.000) 
Type of Estimation  Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects 
Number of observations  290  290  290 
***p-value  0.01, ** p-value 0.05, *p-value 0.10. 41 
 
Table 5: The effect of Borrower’s CSR and Lender’s CSR on the cost of capital  
Table 5 estimates syndicated loans cost of capital in terms of borrower’s CSR, lender’s CSR as well as different 
controls defined in Appendix 1. High_Borrower_CSR=1 (0) if Borrower_CSR is above (below) sample mean; 
High_Lender_CSR=1 (0) if Lender_CSR is above (below) sample mean. From these variables, we define the 
interactions High_Borrower×High_Lender; High_Borrower×Low_Lender; and Low_Borrower×High_Lender. 
The coefficients are standardized and in parentheses there are the standard errors of each coefficient.  
Borrower_CSR  -0.127*** 
(0.051) 
-0.164*** 




(0.073)     
Lender_CSR  -0.124** 
(0.069) 
0.037 
(0.068)     
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2  23.62%  26.14%  35.17%  35.50% 
Fitness of the model (F test)  40.90 (0.000)  44.59 (0.001)  49.42 (0.018)  100.86 (0.000) 
Hausman Test
1  5.93 (0.980)  22.48 (0.167)  25.11 (0.102)  7.42 (0.964) 
Type of estimation  Random Effects  Random Effects  Random Effects  Random Effects 
Number of observations  290  290  290  290 
***p-value    0.01,  **  p-value  0.05,  *p-value  0.10.  Fitness  test  is  the  Wald  test  as  all  are  random-effects 
estimations  42 
 
Table 6: The effect of Borrower’s CSR and Lender’s CSR on the cost of capital  
Table 6 estimates syndicated loan rates in terms of borrower’s CSR, lender’s CSR as well as different controls 
defined  in  Appendix  1.  High_Borrower_CSR=1  (0)  if  Borrower_CSR  is  above  (below)  sample  mean; 
High_Lender_CSR=1 (0) if Lender_CSR is above (below) sample mean. From the previous variables we define 
the  interactions  High_Borrower×High_Lender;  High_Borrower×Low_Lender;  and 
Low_Borrower×High_Lender. We instrument the variables that rely on Borrower_CSR following a two-stage 
procedure described in the text. The coefficients are standardized and in parentheses there are the standard errors 
of each coefficient.  
Borrower_CSR  -0.182*** 
(0.062) 
-0.401** 




(0.072)     
Lender_CSR  -0.406** 
(0.198) 
0.078 
(0.067)     
High_Borrower_CSR 
   
-0.581*** 
(0.182)   
High_Lender_CSR 
   
-0.515*** 
(0.102)   
High_Borrower×High_Lender 
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2  43.21%  57.26%  32.86%  37.49% 
Fitness of the model (F test)  4.72 (0.000)  44.05 (0.007)  14.20 (0.000)  100.86 (0.000) 
Hausman Test
1  89.09 (0.000)  17.33 (0.567)  97.19 (0.000)  5.12 (0.998) 
Type of estimation  Fixed Effects  Random Effects  Fixed Effects  Random Effects 
Number of observations  290  290  290  290 
***p-value  0.01, ** p-value 0.05, *p-value 0.10. Fitness test is the F test for the fixed-effect estimations, while it 
is the Wald test as the random-effects estimations. 